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This review aims at an understanding of the binding process by synthesizing the extant per-
spectives regarding binding. It begins with a consideration of the biological explanations of
binding, viz., conjunctive coding, synchrony, and reentrant mechanisms. Thereafter bind-
ing is reviewed as a psychological process guided by top-down signals. The stages and
types of binding proposed by various researchers are discussed in this section. The next
section introducesWorkingMemory (WM) as the executive directing the top-down signals.
After that it is described howWM works by selecting relevant sensory input, followed by
a detailed consideration of the debate regarding objects vs. features with the conclusion
that relevance is the key factor determining what is processed.The next section considers
other factors affecting the selection of relevant input.Then, we shift focus to describe what
happens to irrelevant input – whether it is discarded at the outset or is gradually inhibited,
and whether inhibition is a perceptual or post-perceptual process. The concluding section
describes the process of binding as currently understood on the basis of the literature
included in the review.To summarize, it appears that initially the “object” is conceptualized
as an instantaneous bundle of all features. However, only relevant features of stimuli are
gradually integrated to form a stable representation of the object. Concomitantly, irrele-
vant features are removed from the object representations. Empirical evidence suggests
that the inhibition of irrelevant features occurs over time and is presumably a process
withinWM.
Keywords: feature binding, top-down and bottom-up processing, inhibition
Binding is the process whereby separate entities are linked together
to form a unified, coherent representation of the world around
us. Feature binding refers to linking various characteristics of the
stimulus to form a coherent representation of the stimulus. Cog-
nitive scientists postulate binding to be one of the basic processes
in information processing ranging from object identification to
consciousness (Crick and Koch, 1990, but, see Singer and Gray,
1995; Crick and Koch, 2003; Zimmer et al., 2006).
People from myriad backgrounds study binding. Philosophy
debates whether the solution will be neurobiological, functional,
computational, or a completely different kind. Empirical science
focuses on how a person solves the binding problem at the neural
or behavioral level. Rapid strides have been made in our under-
standing of the binding problem from the biological as well as
the psychological perspectives, since the concept came into focus
in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, researchers from diverse back-
grounds often work within their microcosms, scarcely appreciating
the similar nature of work in other researchers’ worlds. Moreover
the diversity of current views regarding the process causes concern
that the field may become excessively fragmented. Thus, this review
is primarily attempting a synthesis of the existing views regard-
ing binding. It particularly tries to bring together insights from
the biological and psychological perspectives regarding binding.
The theme that emerges is that relevance of features is crucial in
the binding process. Only relevant features are integrated to form
strong clear objects, whilst the irrelevant features are excluded. The
review begins with a consideration of the biological underpinnings
of the binding process.
BRAIN MECHANISMS UNDERLYING FEATURE BINDING: CONJUNCTIVE
CODING VERSUS SYNCHRONY
The reality that is perceived is contingent upon information of
diverse kinds located in many different areas of the brain. The
binding problem exists because information about the features
of every object in the external world is processed to disparate
areas of the brain. Researchers have attempted to study different
mechanisms whereby the brain brings together information that
is initially represented in distinct areas of the brain. The modu-
larity of the brain for processing different kinds of information is
long established. Usually, however, we transcend these disparities,
and accurately and effortlessly bind the myriad of information to
create a holistic representation. So what is the underlying brain
process, which binds together information that is represented in
distinct areas of the brain? Almost all researchers assume that the
answer lies in the identification of specialized neurons or networks
that participate in the same cognitive process at the same time.
When Nobel prize winners Hubel and Wiesel provided evidence
for conjunctively coding cells in the striate cortex of cats (Hubel
and Wiesel, 1959, 1962), and monkeys (Hubel and Wiesel, 1968),
it seemed clear that specialized neurons existed to code the differ-
ent objects that are encountered in the environment. Researchers
soon proposed that specialized cells attuned to specific conjunc-
tions of features are responsible for binding, and that these cells
come together in a workspace that enables the flexibility of bind-
ing and unbinding, and further processing. Fodor and Pylyshyn
(1988) distinguished between vertical “modular faculties” and a
distinct“central horizontal system”capable of sharing information
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across modules. Baars (1988) distinguished between a vast array of
unconscious, specialized, parallel processors, and a single, limited
capacity, serial workspace that allows exchange of information.
Dehaene and Changeux (2004) proposed the “neuronal work-
space hypothesis,” which distinguishes two computational spaces
in the brain, each characterized by a distinct pattern of connectiv-
ity. They proposed a network of “specialized processors,” attuned
to particular type of information, but sharing the characteristics
of specialization, automaticity, and fast feed-forward processing,
as well as “cortical workspace neurons” that break the modu-
larity of the cortex because they are able to send and receive
projections to many distant areas through long range excitatory
neurons. However, the idea of binding due to specialized neu-
rons had a problem with sheer numbers. The quandary was how
to grapple with the numerous stimuli, account for transience of
binding, and at the same time limit the huge number of con-
junctively coding neurons required for all the binding operations.
Computational models attempted to show how the magnitude of
numbers could be significantly reduced. Mel and Fiser (2000) use
an algorithm that gradually “acquires” a representation by choos-
ing features that are statistically most likely to distinguish objects
from their noisy environments. In the process, the system invokes
any available strategy to limit processing to one or a small num-
ber of objects at a time, including biological mechanisms such as
the fovea, or psychological ones such as attention. Proposing dif-
ferent types of bindings, O’Reilly and his associates suggest that
higher order bindings can result from coarse coded representa-
tions. In fact, Cer and O’Reilly (2006) held that the posterior cortex
deals with low order conjunctions with distributed coarse coded
representations, the hippocampus deals with higher order con-
junctions such as episodes or locations, whilst the prefrontal cortex
actively maintains transient bindings in service of current goals.
As is evident, these models reduce the problem of huge numbers
only by proposing additions to the architecture or subdivisions
within their models, either of which increase the complexity of
the explanation.
Synchrony thus gained in popularity as an apparently more
parsimonious alternative physiological explanation for binding. It
was Von der Malsburg (1981) who first contended that a complex
environment requires parallel processing of information related
to different objects or events, and posited neural synchrony as the
mechanism whereby such information is bound together. Singer
and Gray (1995) suggested that binding is explained by transient
and precise synchronization of neuronal discharges, discovered
in their laboratory by Gray et al. (1992) in the cat striate cortex.
Indeed, synchronization was later reported in species ranging from
locusts (MacLeod et al., 1998), to cats and monkeys (Gray, 1999),
and of course, in humans (Singer, 1999). The idea of synchrony
assumes that binding occurs throughout the brain, synchronous
firing of cortical neurons leading to binding of features. The pro-
posal faces two problems. The first is with respect to how two
(or more) bound objects are differentiated. Although oscillation
between out of phase firing has been proposed as a possible mecha-
nism to encode separate objects, it is difficult to imagine how such a
precise timing mechanism is implemented, considering that there
are always multiple objects in the external world, and in addition
to that, the brain itself is a highly noisy environment. The second
problem is related to the implication that the same neurons encode
all binding operations, entailing that binding is transient. Precisely,
the problem is how to account for permanence of representations
after the stimulus is no longer there. Thus, synchrony seems to be
an adequate explanation of binding, only for a single object, and
that too only when it is present as a percept.
Nevertheless, physiological evidence exists for specialized
processors as well as synchrony, and is hard to refute. Thus, many
researchers tried to resolve the dispute between synchrony and
specialized neurons by proposing different kinds of bindings, but
in the process merely ended up reiterating the debate. Crick and
Koch (1990) differentiated three kinds of bindings. First, bindings
“hardwired” by genes or the experience of distant ancestors that
determine the response to natural stimuli. Second, bindings learnt
due to experience such as those required for recognizing familiar
faces, or the letters of the alphabet; and third, transient bindings of
novel stimuli which require focal attention. These are presumably
based on neural synchrony, and if the stimulus is repeated often
enough, develop into the second kind of bindings. Baddeley (2007)
mentioned two types of bindings, passive binding, contingent on
automatic processes; and active binding, which requires attention.
The examples used by him suggest that while the former refers to
binding elements of the natural world for which humans are “pre-
pared” in an evolutionary sense, the latter type refers to binding of
arbitrary, learnt elements. He further adds that long term episodic
memory provides a third source of binding. Clearly these ideas
are similar to the tripartite distinction by Crick and Koch (1990).
VanRullen (2009) also distinguishes between hardwired binding of
natural/frequently encountered objects, and on-demand binding
of meaningless/arbitrary feature conjunctions, asserting that while
the latter always requires attention, the former requires attention
only if there is competition between multiple objects, thus empha-
sizing the inhibitory function of attention. Hommel and Colzato
(2009) similarly hold that binding can take place through neural
synchronization of all features present at a time, or because a
stored detector exists for real/familiar objects. They too, admit
the possibility of both processes acting together.
BEYOND PERCEPTUAL INTEGRATION: RECURRENT PROCESSES
Despite this measure of acceptance, there is also a sense that mere
perceptual integration of features, whether by synchrony or by spe-
cialized neurons, simply does not encapsulate all characteristics of
bindings as coherent objects essential for all information process-
ing. An object cannot be defined only as a cluster of features.
Different features not only need to be integrated into a whole,
but this “whole” needs to be consistent, distinct, and meaningful.
Consistency would come from object persistence, distinctness is a
concomitant of clarity and contrast from other objects; and mean-
ingfulness implies that the object is of some consequence in the
information processing sequence. To achieve these characteristics,
the basic information supplied by separate features has to be trans-
formed. This transformation is achieved by top-down processes
that presumably select only the relevant features for processing.
At the physiological level, the selection of relevant features is
done by the reentrant processes in the brain. These are the down-
ward and lateral connections that feedback information to lower
levels in the brain. As in any good communication system, the
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brain too relies on feedback mechanisms. In the visual system, for
example, the lower level neurons in Area V1 send signals for for-
ward processing, but it is also true that all higher visual centers
have reentrant (downward) connections with Area V1. An impor-
tant characteristic of reentrant connections is that they not only
feedback to the original neurons, but also “receive” signals back
from them. Communication between brain areas is therefore a
continuous, iterative process.
The dichotomy between synchrony and specialized neurons
is thus currently transcended by proposals that ascribe para-
mount importance to the evidence of reentrant processes in the
brain. These top-down processes are linked to higher cognitive
functions. Edelman (1978) first proposed that reentrant signal-
ing may be important in integrating disparate cortical areas and
higher brain functions. Damasio (1989) specifically argued that
recall and recognition involve reactivation of the same areas that
were involved in initial registration of conjunctions. This is done
by means of “convergence zones” that enable retroactivation of
multiple regions in the brain.
The crux of the reentrant theory is that brain processes are
inherently iterative because of the hierarchical nature of the sys-
tem and the fact that as information is processed in the higher
areas the receptive fields become larger and lose their feature speci-
ficity. Thus one or more cycles are required to establish a stable
representation. Reentrant processes confirm the correct features,
resolve competition, and thus allow accurate bindings to take place
(Di Lollo et al., 2000; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Bullier, 2001;
Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002; Hamker, 2003).
As far as the visual system is concerned, such signals emanate
from the parietal cortex. Saalmann et al. (2007) studied how pari-
etal output influences early sensory areas in macaques performing
a visual matching task. They found that output from parietal areas
increased activity in the early areas, and concluded that this repre-
sented top-down feedback from the parietal cortex to early sensory
areas that helped to focus attention on relevant locations. Silvanto
et al. (2009) used triple pulses of TMS over PPC to find that
they led to excitation in the visual areas when applied unilater-
ally, demonstrating the top-down modulation of the visual areas
by PPC.
Reentrant connections in the brain may also be combined
with dynamic changes in synchronous activity to explain how
the bound object is distinguished from the background, or indeed
from other objects (Seth et al., 2004;Van der Togt et al., 2006). Thus
reentrant processes are now accepted to be crucial for binding.
Indeed, so compelling is this evidence that it has led to a rethink
regarding the very concept of binding among many researchers.
From the initial idea that all features are inevitably, instanta-
neously, and automatically bound together, there is a change to the
view that reentrant connections confirm and integrate only some
of the features in an iterative, resource-demanding process. There
is a clear and discernible shift from the assessment of binding as a
product to conceptualizing it as a process.
BINDING AS A PROCESS GUIDED BY TOP-DOWN SIGNALS
Treisman (1996) proposed three sequential mechanisms to solve
the binding problem: selection of particular locations by a spa-
tial attention window, inhibition of locations from feature maps
containing unwanted features, and top-down activation of the
location containing the currently attended object for further pro-
cessing. She also speculated that reentry to area V1 or V2 mediated
all these three different mechanisms, proposing that reentrant
connections from parietal areas mediate spatial attention, from
extra-striate areas mediate feature based selection, and from the
inferior temporal cortex mediate object based selection. Treisman
(2006) holds that the initial response of the brain is to activate
feature detectors in the early striate and extra-striate areas that
automatically connect to compatible temporal lobe object nodes,
and perhaps inhibit the conflicting ones. The parietal cortex then
controls a serial reentry scan of the V1 and V2 areas to retrieve
the features present in each, and then these are combined to form
integrated object representations or bindings.
Humphreys (2001) and his co-workers also propose a two
stage account of binding (Humphreys et al., 2000, 2009; Cinel
and Humphreys, 2006; Braet and Humphreys, 2009). The initial
evidence for this two stage process came from a patient GK with
bilateral parietal lesions (Humphreys et al., 2000). The patient
could bind form elements into shapes, but could not integrate
shapes with color. This prompted the idea that the initial stage of
binding results in shapes, and thereafter, surface features are asso-
ciated with the shapes. Cinel and Humphreys (2006) proposed
that in the initial noisy stage, visual elements are weakly bound,
and these bindings can dissipate unless they are consolidated into
more stable and stronger representations by being reinforced by
top-down attentional feedback modulated by the posterior parietal
cortex. Humphreys et al. (2009) showed that form conjunctions
were easier to detect than difficult feature targets by controls and
parietal patients alike, whereas parietal patients were significantly
impaired in detecting other cross domain conjunctions. Braet and
Humphreys (2009) respectively used feature detection errors and
conjunction errors as inversely related measures of feature detec-
tion and binding, and found that a patient with bilateral parietal
lesions generated illusory conjunctions with unusually long dis-
play durations. Also, when transcranial magnetic stimulation was
applied to the parietal cortex in normal participants, it led to an
increase in conjunction errors, but only 150–200 ms after stimu-
lus onset. Thus, they held that binding occurs due to reentrant
communication emanating from the posterior parietal cortex.
Roelfsema (2006) postulates two mechanisms in the visual sys-
tem responsible for binding – base grouping and incremental
grouping. Base groupings are coded by single neurons tuned to
multiple features, and reflect the selectivity of feed-forward con-
nections. But, all possible feature combinations cannot be coded
by dedicated neurons. Therefore, a second, flexible form of group-
ing called incremental grouping needs to be posited. Incremental
grouping augments the responses of the set of neurons coding sep-
arate features that are bound in perception. It takes more time than
base grouping because it relies on horizontal and feedback connec-
tions, besides the feed-forward ones. The modulation of neuronal
response strength, i.e., the firing rate of neurons, during the incre-
mental grouping stage parallels the behavioral fact that attention
is directed to features that are indicated by the enhanced neu-
ronal response, and those features are then bound together. Base
grouping takes place initially in the system, followed by incremen-
tal grouping in the cortex. This basic theory has been enhanced
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to propose a computational model that predicts figure-ground
separation as well as binding (Jehee et al., 2007).
Zimmer et al. (2006) distinguish between transient binding
and more durable binding, implying that different mechanisms
probably bind features at different points in time, and/or there is
a process of consolidation that transforms transient binding into
durable binding. Shifting the focus to a very late stage in the bind-
ing process and thus proposing an integrated model of binding
in WM and long term memory, Murre et al. (2006) also distin-
guish between transient and permanent binding, suggesting that
while the former reflect the capacity of WM to select task rele-
vant information for processing, the latter is the capacity of the
neural system to store coherent patterns in LTM. Their emphasis,
nevertheless, is that there is a constant interaction between these
two. “What is transiently bound in WM governs what is temporar-
ily and eventually permanently bound in long term memory. In
turn, what is permanently bound affects transient binding in WM.
The interplay of these binding processes determines how the brain
develops into a structured system that is cumulatively correlated
with its environment, thus implementing a process that is able to
lift itself to higher levels of cognitive functioning” (Murre et al.,
2006, p. 244).
Emphasizing the top-down factors even more, Hommel and
Colzato (2009) propose that memory for a binding is controlled
by two kinds of priming processes. Offline priming happens before
the stimulus is presented, due to foreknowledge about the relevant
features, task instructions, manipulation of mental set, etc. Online
priming is induced by stimuli that have entries in long term mem-
ory, such as familiar objects. These are detected in a non-selective
fast feed-forward sweep, followed by recurrent processes refining
the input according to the operating principles of the attentional
set for that task.
Summary so far
In line with these ideas, one may conclude that binding is a con-
tinuous process that begins with the sensory input which goes
to myriad areas of the brain and ends when the bound object
emerges in memory such that it is strong enough to be manipu-
lated further for higher cognitive processes. Features are initially
perceived together either through synchrony or by neurons coded
to detect conjunctions. This integration is a largely automatic,
non-conscious process, which thereafter is refined by iterative
processes and ultimately allows differentiation and dissemination
of information in conscious states.
WORKING MEMORY AS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTING TOP-DOWN
REENTRANT PROCESSES
The process of binding inevitably begins with the physical con-
tinua impinging on the sense organs. But it is equally true that
the information regarding stimuli does not enter an empty box.
The brain has its own ideas! The top-down control of behavior by
mental representations of goals, instructions, and ideas is perhaps
as undeniable as the source of behavior in bottom-up process-
ing of stimulation. A logical assumption is that since the reentrant
signals emanate from the cortical regions higher up in the process-
ing hierarchy, they reflect top-down modulation of the process of
binding. The question still remains as to what is at the “top”?
What directs the reentrant processes? Working Memory (hence-
forth WM) seems to be the executive guiding all processes of the
brain in the service of current goals. The prototype model of WM
(Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley and Logie, 1999) emphasized
that different kinds of information are processed by distinct mental
systems that act together to deal effectively with tasks confronting
a healthy human adult. Baddeley and Hitch (1974) distinguished
two subsystems, the phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketch-
pad, and a control system called the central executive. To deal with
the fact that the information processed in these subsystems is often
combined, and indeed, is at some stage also linked to information
in the long term permanent store, Baddeley (2000) proposed a
fourth component, the “episodic buffer.” The episodic buffer was
initially theorized to be controlled by the executive, but was pri-
marily a storage system linked to conscious awareness, that binds
together information from different sources in episodes. Thus, the
episodic buffer was proposed as the answer to the binding problem
(Baddeley, 2003).
Logie (2003) conceptualized WM as a mental workspace that
deals with integrated objects identifiable on the basis of prior
knowledge. He maintains that sensory input reaches WM only
after it has activated the knowledge base. Thus what reaches the
workspace is the result of an amalgamation of the sensory input
and the knowledge base. Since another source of input into the
workspace is retrieval generated by processes in WM such as
imagery, he holds that WM does not act as a gateway for pro-
cessing information into LTM (substantiated by Van der Meulen
et al., 2009). The workspace model implies that feature binding
takes place concomitantly with or before the object representation
evokes prior knowledge, which in turn, precedes the manipula-
tion of the object in the mental workspace. Nevertheless, other
kinds of binding, such as between objects and their semantic asso-
ciates, or between percepts and images, or between images, or
among sequentially presented objects, presumably takes place in
the workspace that is WM. The basic units in WM are thus per-
ceived objects. Nevertheless, the model can also be interpreted to
accommodate the idea that features themselves might evoke prior
representations in LTM and then the processes of WM refine the
representation so that it emerges as an object.
Although there are many interpretations of WM as a concept
and consequently many different models exist in current literature
(reviewed by Miyake and Shah, 1999; Osaka et al., 2007), consen-
sus exists on two important characteristics. First there is a general
assumption that physiological level explanations are tenable for the
WM phenomena observed at the behavioral level. Second, atten-
tion has a crucial and largely inhibitory role to play in all models
of WM. Both these characteristics imply that WM is the top exec-
utive, the “controller,” managing the stimuli. It is in this sense that
one may conceptualize WM as the source of top-down influences
directing recurrent processes.
HOW DOES WORKING MEMORY WORK – BY SELECTING RELEVANT
INPUT?
The advocates of top-down processes regularly invoke and use
the concept of WM as the top executive in their theories. The
biased competition theory by Desimone and Duncan (1995) pro-
posed that WM content in terms of instructional set, task goals,
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etc., facilitates the selection of matching sensory input. The biased
competition model rests on the assumption that attending to an
object causes a bias signal to be sent by higher areas to the lower
sensory areas which increases their tonic activity without necessar-
ily increasing the neural responses evoked by the external stimulus
itself. Behaviorally, this assumes that incoming sensory stimula-
tion is matched with a template which specifies the relevance or
otherwise of the received stimulation. Although Duncan (2006)
concedes that in principle, competitive bias can begin anywhere in
the system and then spread to the higher and/or lower levels, he
also reiterates the role of task relevance and an associated pattern
of fronto-parietal activity that he calls the multiple demand pat-
tern because it is produced by many different kinds of cognitive
demands. No wonder that his theory is usually taken to be a prime
exemplar of the emphasis on top-down processing.
Based on studies using single unit recordings in macaques
(Chelazzi et al., 1993), it was held that a state of competition
always exists among the variety of sensory inputs at any moment.
Stronger sensory inputs usually win out, but the representations
in WM bias the competition such that inputs matching them are
the ones that are strengthened and selected for further process-
ing. The contention that competition is essential for attention to
emerge is supported by neuroimaging evidence that the posterior
parietal cortex, which is activated when visuo-spatial attention is
focused, promotes feature binding when there is a potential for
confusion with the simultaneous presence of other objects. Kast-
ner et al. (1998) used fMRI evidence to substantiate that when
stimuli are simultaneously presented, their cortical representations
interact in a competitive and suppressive way in the ventral (object
recognition) pathway. However, this was not evident when stim-
uli were presented sequentially. In a second experiment, spatial
attention focused on the objects was found to counteract the sup-
pressive effect, and more so in the simultaneous as compared to
the sequential presentation condition. Using fMRI, Shafritz et al.
(2002) established that the posterior parietal cortex was active
when multiple objects were simultaneously presented, but not
when they were sequentially presented in the same location (at
fixation).
WHAT IS SELECTED AS RELEVANT INPUT? OBJECTS OR FEATURES?
Currently, there is conflicting evidence regarding the level to which
distracters are represented in the brain. Some researchers propose
that all objects and features are automatically and implicitly repre-
sented in the brain up to a level that excludes semantic processing
(reviewed by Thoma et al., 2004). Nevertheless some studies indi-
cate that even unattended objects are habitually processed to the
semantic level (Pins et al., 2004; Altmann et al., 2005). Attempt-
ing a resolution, Martinovic et al. (2009) used EEG to find evi-
dence that induced gamma band activity was enhanced due to
the presence of distracter objects under low load conditions, thus
providing evidence for cortical representation of distracters. How-
ever, as perceptual load increased, attentional selection played a
more important role, and gamma band activity was limited to the
attended object with a general suppression of all activity linked
to surrounding information. This corroborates Duncan’s views
regarding suppression of distracters by attention in consonance
with top-down directions.
Emphasizing the integrated nature of processing of objects,
Duncan (1996, 1998, 2006) held that since the object features are
encoded in an integrated fashion across different cortical regions,
if attention is directed to one feature, all features of the object,
whether relevant or irrelevant, become dominant in their respec-
tive regions of the brain. Support for this idea came from fMRI data
by O’Craven et al. (1999) who found that neural activity increased
in response to the attended as well as non-attended task-irrelevant
attribute of the stimulus. Nevertheless, their studies also provided
evidence for differential level of activity, with the absolute amount
of activity being stronger for relevant features than for irrelevant
ones in the attended object. More definitive data were provided
by Schoenfeld et al. (2003) who recorded event related potentials
as well as event related magnetic fields together with fMRI to find
that the irrelevant feature was activated rapidly enough to partic-
ipate in the perceptual integration and binding of the attended
object. Using event related potentials, Winkler et al. (2005) found
evidence that pre-attentive binding of relevant as well as irrelevant
features occurs “normally” in visual as well as auditory modality,
and that attention is required for correct binding only under spe-
cial circumstances when high load displays are processed under
high time pressure.
Thus, in considering the difference between relevant and irrel-
evant, the distinction between features and objects is crucial in
Duncan’s theory. Duncan (1980) asserted that only targets are
selectively processed through the limited capacity system, non-
target objects are identified and rejected by initial parallel and
unconscious processes. Nevertheless, this selectivity is not assumed
to operate on features. Duncan (1984) showed that perceptual
identification of properties inherent in two different objects is
much more difficult than when the features are combined in a sin-
gle object. However, if two features are combined within a single
object, the visual system finds it as easy to encode a combination
of two features such as orientation and texture, as to encode them
separately. Duncan (1998) provided evidence that it is also hard to
identify two separate targets presented within the same modality,
though there is no problem in detecting targets that differ between
modalities. Thus, the features of an object are integrated such that
they are processed together in an all or none fashion. Directing
attention to a selected object enhances the representation of all
its features together (Egly et al., 1994; Duncan et al., 1997). The
objects compete with each other and the winner is processed fur-
ther at the cost of widespread suppression of the distracters or
the ‘to be ignored’ objects. Competition is biased and ultimately
resolved in favor of task relevant objects, and typically this state is
achieved over 100–200 ms and is sustained by attention.
Luck and his associates also contend that the basic units on
which VWM operates are objects rather than features. Luck and
Vogel (1997) held that VWM was object based because remember-
ing one feature such as color allowed the recall of another without
any additional cost. Vogel et al. (2001) confirmed that VWM can
hold three to four chunks of information, be they features or
bound objects. This evidence suggests that VWM stores integrated
objects rather than features, and objects are thus the basic units
of VWM. Woodman and Luck (2007) tested the prediction of
the biased competition model that a match between the template
held in WM and the sensory input always leads to a facilitation
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of performance. They used a dual-task paradigm and asked par-
ticipants to perform a visual search task while maintaining object
representations in VWM at the same time, but found no such facil-
itation of performance. Nevertheless, the reaction time was faster
for matching distracters. When the participants knew beforehand
that the target would never match the item retained in memory,
they could direct attention away from the items that matched the
WM representation. Thus they found an inhibitory effect and con-
cluded that participants can use the content of WM strategically
to inhibit as well as facilitate attentional processing. Moores and
Maxwell (2008) also found that prior stimuli in WM captured
attention even in the absence of bottom-up priming, and influ-
enced the response of the participant, despite the influence being
detrimental to the task. Indeed one important purpose of VWM
is postulated to be the control of eye movements (denoting atten-
tion), specifically the initial direction and subsequent correction
of gaze toward particular objects in visual search (Hollingworth
et al., 2008; Hollingworth and Luck, 2009).
In contrast to these theories emphasizing the top-down nature
of processing of integrated objects, are accounts of behavior that
stress the role of different features of the stimuli to be processed.
These accounts vary in their espousal of top-down mechanisms.
For example, the feature integration theory (Treisman and Gelade,
1980; Treisman, 2006) and contingent capture theory (Folk et al.,
1992, 1993; Folk and Remington, 2006) ascribe paramount impor-
tance to top-down factors implemented through attention. At
the other extreme are the accounts of stimulus driven capture
(Theeuwes, 1992, 2004), and dimension weighting (Muller and
Krummenacher, 2006), which primarily emphasize the impor-
tance of bottom-up factors in capturing attention. Nevertheless,
they are similar in stressing one or more features as being relatively
more important in the process of binding.
The feature integration theory (Treisman and Gelade, 1980;
Treisman, 1988, 1998) suggests that attention to particular loca-
tions is the most important factor in feature binding, implying that
all features present at a particular location are inevitably bound
together if attention is focused on them. Treisman and Zhang
(2006) reiterated the importance of locations in binding in VWM
as well. This view makes binding a relatively automatic process
triggered off by attention to particular locations. Basically, it pos-
tulates a master map of locations, and as attention is focused on any
area of this map, the object in that location is encoded. Also, while
detection of features is contingent on independent maps for each
feature, other types of searches, particularly conjunction search, is
driven by the master map of locations that integrates information
from other maps to produce the signals that make each stimulus
salient (Treisman and Sato, 1990; Wheeler and Treisman, 2002).
Kahneman et al. (1992) proposed the object file theory, accord-
ing to which objects are primarily identified by their positional
marker or spatial index. Thereafter, other properties of the object,
color, shape, etc., are associated with the spatial index. Spatiotem-
poral continuity is essential for maintaining object file representa-
tions, whereas non-spatial properties such as color and shape are
unimportant. Direct evidence in support of this idea comes from
the object reviewing paradigm (Kahneman et al., 1992; Mitroff and
Alvarez, 2007), the multiple object tracking paradigm (Pylyshyn,
2004), visual search in dynamic displays (Horowitz and Wolfe,
1998; Alvarez et al., 2007); and developmental evidence showing
that young infants rely on spatiotemporal rather than surface fea-
tures or identity information to make sense of their visual world
(Feigenson and Carey, 2005).
Applying the feature integration theory and the idea of object
files specifically to the binding process, Treisman (2006) main-
tained that pre-attentively, features, and locations are registered
in different maps, and focused attention binds them together. She
mentioned three components of the binding process, and suggests
that we shift attention in space to select one object after another,
suppress features of other objects, and finally bind selected features
together into “object files.” Note that she contends that initially,
features are processed in parallel and stored as separate traces,
which are only inhibited, but not completely eradicated, in the
binding process. Revisiting the feature integration theory, Chan
and Hayward (2009) have provided fresh evidence for dissociation
between feature detection and localization, involving respectively
parallel and focal search.
To completely grasp the implications of Treisman’s ideas, it is
instructive to contrast them with Duncan’s model. One difference
is their view of binding. For Duncan, binding happens at a very
early stage in the visual process and the basic units in his theory
are bound representations or objects. For Treisman, binding is a
process of continuous refinement, during which features become
linked to a master map of locations. Features remain bound only as
long as attention is focused on them. Any irrelevant features con-
tinue to exist in an attenuated form. Another related but important
point of distinction lies in their disparate view of the role of atten-
tion in binding. While Treisman views attention to be a selective
process essential for binding, Duncan assumes that features are
already bound into objects (probably through conjunctive coding
by neural detectors) and then biased competition between objects
occurs accompanied by a state of attention. Attention is thus an
emergent property of the system, and the mechanism that aids top-
down biased selection of some objects over others. It follows that
Treisman holds attention to be an earlier process than Duncan.
Finally the most important influence in the process of attention
for Treisman is location, so attention is basically spatial in nature,
whereas for Duncan, it is an emergent property of the system that is
weighted in many ways, but essentially by task relevance more than
anything else. Despite these differences, both agree that attention
is necessary for binding separate features into a coherent object.
Treisman’s insistence that attention was primarily spatial also
conflicted with experiments showing attention capture by abrupt
onsets, the tendency of anything unusual in the field to attract
involuntary attention, even if participants are set to ignore them
(Remington et al., 1992). Nevertheless, the contingent capture the-
ory (Folk et al., 1992, 1993; Folk and Remington, 2006) holds that
attentional capture, as for example, by abrupt onsets, is contin-
gent on top-down attentional control settings. This was because
the original experiments showed that abrupt onset cues captured
attention when the task was to identify onset target, but color cues
captured attention when the task was to respond to color targets.
Folk et al. (2008) have established that non-spatial attention is
also subject to capture that is contingent on top-down settings.
In their experiments, a change in the color of the distracter such
that it matched the target, decreased target detection. Folk et al.
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(2009), showed that even non-spatial distracters which did not
capture attention, nonetheless, influenced responses to a target.
The guided search model (Wolfe et al., 1989; Wolfe, 1994) had a
rather different concern regarding the feature integration theory.
Wolfe et al. (1989) pointed out that except for locations, the feature
integration theory did not differentiate between other features of
the stimuli. Further, it presumed that parallel processing of features
in the initial pre-attentive stage did not have any impact on the later
attentive serial search. The guided search model proposed that the
features which were processed in the parallel stage guided atten-
tion in the subsequent serial stage,primarily by dividing the stimuli
into distracters and probable targets. Further, they provided evi-
dence that search for conjunctions defined by three features was
more efficient than conjunctions of two features, simply because
more number of features guided search for triple conjunctions.
Wolfe (1994) acknowledged the special role of location by mod-
ifying the model to suggest that the output of processing in the
initial massively parallel stage guided spatial attention and thus
the second serial stage processed input from a limited portion of
the visual field. Note that this reverses the sequence of the relative
influence of location and other features postulated by the feature
integration theory which holds that other features are attached to
a master map of locations and hence spatial attention precedes
and guides attention to features (Treisman and Sato, 1990).
The idea that each feature is coded within its own feature map
was extended by Vidal et al. (2005) to include the notion of “struc-
tural gist.” Their Experiments 1, 2, and 3 using a change detection
task with a study-test interval of 1000 ms showed that it was more
difficult to detect changes of only color, only shape, or only ori-
entation, in a target item, if the distracters also changed on the
same dimension as compared to a condition where there was no
change in distracters. Experiment 4 showed that change detection
was impaired when an item that remained on screen during the
study-test interval changed in the same dimension as the target,
demonstrating that encoding relational information was possible
even when it was not presented simultaneously. In Experiments 5
and 6, they compared conditions when distracters could change
on the same dimension as the target, or on a different dimen-
sion. Changes in a different dimension, however, did not have an
effect on performance, whereas changes in the same dimension did
affect performance. It was more difficult to detect feature changes
when the distracters also changed features on the same dimen-
sion, as compared to when the distracters changed on some other
feature dimension. Thus they proposed that each item in each fea-
ture map is encoded in terms of individual as well as configural
information. The effects of relational information are particularly
strong within each feature map. Their experiments considered
only changes in colors, shapes, and orientation, keeping loca-
tion constant. However, Jiang et al. (2000) had earlier reported
that detection of changes in color was impervious to change in
locations of non-targets.
The dimension weighting account (Muller and Krummen-
acher, 2006), which may also be considered an extension of the
guided search model, holds that attentional weights are allocated
to basic visual dimensions (such as color, orientation, etc.), on the
basis of stimuli defined by features (red, tilted, etc). Enhanced fea-
ture contrast within a dimension, e.g., red vs. green rather than
yellow vs. green, and amplified saliency signals about a dimen-
sion to the overall saliency map, can facilitate detection of targets
defined by that dimension, or alternatively target detection may
be delayed if the target dimension changes across trials, shifting
the weight to a new target defining dimension. They propose that
the dimension weight can never be set to zero and indeed, may
reflect the speed of processing associated with various dimensions.
Weighting effects are proposed to be pre-attentive, influencing
dimension based saliency signals before the overall saliency com-
putation which is the basis of attentional selection of objects.
Nevertheless, weight shift can be modulated through expectancies
set up by cues, instructions, past experience, etc. In this sense the
role of top-down processes is acknowledged. Muller et al. (2009)
used the singleton salient distracter paradigm and showed how
distracter influence varied with relevant practice, such that par-
ticipants could learn to suppress distracters depending on the
incentive to use suppression which in turn was presumed to vary
with the probability of occurrence of the distracter. Nevertheless
the costs of dimensional cueing in these studies could be, in part
at least, due to task switching in general. Pan et al. (2009) stud-
ied the effect of dimensional cueing when the relevant dimensions
were known to the participants. In fact, participants were explicitly
instructed to prepare the relevant dimension on congruent trials
and discard the irrelevant dimension on incongruent trials. Par-
ticipants received a dimensional cue to be held in memory, and
were subsequently tested on it either before or after a test of atten-
tion. Response latency was more on incongruent trials and less
on congruent trials as compared to neutral trials. The benefits of
congruency were enhanced when the cued dimension had to be
held in memory throughout the trial, i.e., when the memory test
was given after the attention test. This study demonstrates that the
contents of WM can have an effect, and in fact, have more positive
than negative effects on performance.
Theeuwes and his colleagues have consistently adhered to a
strict bottom-up account of behavior (Theeuwes, 1992, 2004;
Theeuwes et al., 2006). Their paradigm essentially investigates the
effect of a singleton distracter defined by a different dimension
than the one defining the singleton target. Theeuwes (1992) used
a distracter defined by color (the only red among all green), and
a target defined by shape (the only diamond among circles). The
initial check confirmed that RTs were quicker to color than to
shape, showing it to be more salient. Then participants performed
under two conditions, one in which the distracter was present, and
the other in which it was not. Results showed significant distracter
interference in that RTs were significantly slower when the dis-
tracter was present. The embarrassing question for adherents of
top-down influences was why participants were unable to ignore
the distracter; despite the fact that they knew what dimensions
were defining the target and the distracters. Schreij et al. (2008)
reported that abruptly occurring distracters produce costs in per-
formance even in the presence of a top-down set for color. They
argue that these results show that abrupt onset of new objects
captures attention independent of a top-down set and thus, pro-
vides conclusive evidence against the idea that attention capture is
contingent only on top-down attention control settings.
It is, of course, possible to take an eclectic view of the
tripartite competition among researchers who have proposed
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objects, locations, or features to be the units of visual processing.
Humphreys (1998) proposing a dual coding account of repre-
sentation of objects in space, contends that we have a rather poor
representation of space per se. However, objects are spatially repre-
sented in two ways, within object representations, where elements
or features are encoded as part of objects, possibly in the ven-
tral stream with some dorsal involvement; and between object
representations, where objects are coded in relation to each other,
presumably involving the dorsal stream. Both these kinds of repre-
sentations exist in parallel. Visual processing capacity is limited by
the competition to encode elements within an object, the number
of objects that can be encoded at the same time, and the relevance
of within object or between object representations to the task. In
this view, unlike the feature integration theory, there is no attempt
to assign a special role to locations. Indeed, the bottom line is that
the objects in space are important. Space in itself is not signifi-
cant. The feature that is important here is form, for form elements
are bound in the absence of focal attention and are later associ-
ated with surface features such as color. In giving this account,
Humphreys also diverges from Duncan, and proposes that com-
petition may exist within the elements of an object as well, and
further, this competition can be biased by task relevance. Thus the
differential effect of features can itself be influenced by top-down
factors.
Linnell and Humphreys (2004) have shown how object based
selection can overrule the central bias, the fact that attention is
primarily directed at fixation and performance decreases as eccen-
tricity of the targets increases. Linnell and Humphreys (2007) used
the odd man out paradigm of visual search and found that when
the participants knew in advance about the feature defining a
target, detection was enhanced due to grouping on that target fea-
ture, and the participants then limited search to that group only.
This grouping by features overruled the central attentional bias
by allowing the grouping of peripheral targets with centrally pre-
sented distracters. They concluded that visual search can be space,
object, or feature based, and in fact, performance is often deter-
mined by an interaction of all three. The real winner is top-down
modulation which directs which of these three are relevant to the
task at hand.
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE SELECTION OF “RELEVANT” INPUT
Current research has largely moved away from the debate among
objects, locations, and features, to focus on how top-down WM
factors influence the encoding and retention of stimuli. An influ-
ential idea delineating how WM deals with distractors is the
load theory of selective attention and cognitive control (Lavie
et al., 2004; Lavie and De Fockert, 2005, 2006). It suggests that
WM provides goal-directed control of visual selective attention by
decreasing interference by goal-irrelevant distracters. Lavie and De
Fockert (2005) tested this idea with the singleton paradigm. They
showed that attention capture by an irrelevant color singleton dur-
ing shape search critically depends on availability of WM to the
search task. When WM was loaded by a concurrent yet unrelated
verbal short-term memory task, capture increased. Increasing WM
load also results in greater distracter interference in Stroop-like
tasks (De Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie et al., 2004). In fact, increasing
WM load leads to greater distracter interference whereas increasing
perceptual load reduces distracter interference (Lavie et al., 2004).
Park et al. (2007) demonstrated that the type of WM load is cru-
cial to this effect using the flankers task with houses and faces
as stimuli. Distracter interference increased when the memory
load items overlapped with the targets, but decreased when they
were similar to the distracters. These findings suggest two selective
attention mechanisms: a perceptual selection mechanism serving
to reduce distracter perception in situations of high perceptual
load that exhaust perceptual capacity in processing relevant stim-
uli and a cognitive control mechanism that reduces interference
from perceived distracters as long as cognitive control functions
are available to maintain current priorities (low cognitive load).
Forster and Lavie (2008) reasoned that in real life situations,
there is as much need to avoid external irrelevant distracters as
there is to suppress relevant distracters. Laboratory studies usually
focus on relevant distracters alone. Thus they compared the effects
of perceptual load on task-irrelevant and task relevant (response
competing) distracters. They found that an entirely irrelevant dis-
tracter can interfere with task performance to the same extent
as a response competing distracter. High perceptual load in the
task eliminated the effect of both types of distracters with simi-
lar effectiveness. Forster and Lavie (2007) showed that although
individual differences in reported distractibility were correlated
with distractibility in a response competition task performed in
the laboratory, high levels of perceptual load in the task reduced
distracter interference for all participants. Forster and Lavie (2009)
demonstrated how a high perceptual load, demanding task rele-
vant processing, concomitantly decreased the frequency of task
unrelated thoughts, and thus reduced “mind wandering.” When
one needs to focus on a task, it is easier to inhibit both external
and internal sources of interference.
Olivers et al. (2006) found that singleton distracters interfered
more with visual search when an additional memory task had to
be performed at the same time. The interference effect was even
stronger when the distracters were virtually the same or related
to the object held in memory. Houtkamp and Roelfsema (2006)
studied whether items in WM influence the deployment of atten-
tion. Using line drawings of simple objects, they asked participants
to remember two objects. After a blank interval of 1000 ms, while
the participant was instructed to search for one of the two items as
a target, the other memory item was sometimes presented as one
of the distracters in an array of items. They found that the dis-
tracter had an effect only if the target was absent. Whenever, the
target was present, the memory item had no effect as a distracter.
Eyes were unlikely to be fixated on the distracter, and if they did,
fixation duration was very short. Thus attention was primarily ori-
ented toward the target, and memory items had an effect only if
the target was absent. The special processing of the target has been
found with objects in real world scenes as well. Details of targets
and distracters related to targets are better retained than the dis-
tracters that are unrelated to the targets, maybe because they are
looked at more frequently as shown by eye movement recordings
(Williams et al., 2005). Brisson et al. (2009) investigated whether
contingent capture required capacity-limited central resources by
incorporating a contingent capture task as the second task in a
dual-task paradigm using N2pc as a marker of spatial attention.
N2pc is an ERP component that appears in the right hemisphere if
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the participant pays attention to the left visual field, and vice versa,
appears in the left hemisphere if attention is focused on the right
visual field. The N2pc was significantly reduced in high concur-
rent central load conditions, indicating that even though it is
involuntary, the deployment of visual-spatial attention occurring
during contingent capture depends on capacity-limited central
resources.
Soto and Humphreys (2008) found that when the WM item
that was used as a cue for one of the distracters, did not match the
subsequent search display, search performance was worse as com-
pared to a neutral baseline. This effect of WM content on search
was reduced when cognitive load was increased, and when articu-
latory suppression was used. Soto et al. (2008) reviewed evidence
emanating from their lab regarding the influence of WM on search
for relevant information from the environment. They contend that
WM automatically guides selection, even if it is detrimental to per-
formance. Further, on the basis of fMRI evidence (Soto et al., 2007)
they assert that this modulation is a top-down process quite dis-
tinct from bottom-up processes such as priming. When a stimulus
held in WM appeared in the search array, there was enhanced
activity in the superior frontal gyrus, mid-temporal, and occipi-
tal areas. In contrast, implicit repetition priming (which involves
mere repetition of a stimulus) elicited a suppressive response. Also
WM probably affects the early process of attention that controls
the entry of information into awareness. Soto and Humphreys
(2009) assessed whether guidance by WM is limited to single task
relevant dimensions, or does it differentially affect bindings of
those dimensions. Participants were asked to remember the shape
of a colored object in memory. Then they were to search for a
target line amongst distracter lines, each embedded within a dif-
ferent object. On some trials, one of the distracter objects in the
search display matched the memory item on the shape, the color,
or both dimensions. Relative to a neutral baseline, where there was
no match between the memory and the search displays, search per-
formance was reduced when a distracter object matched both the
color and the shape of the memory cue, demonstrating that WM
had a greater impact on bindings as compared to single dimen-
sions. Relevance of stimulus input to task goals thus seems to be
the overriding factor in the process of binding.
WHAT HAPPENS TO IRRELEVANT INPUT? DISCARDED AT THE OUTSET
OR GRADUALLY INHIBITED?
Searching for direct evidence, we (Jaswal and Logie, 2011; Logie
et al., 2011) studied the effect of task relevance of features in the
process of feature binding at study-test intervals from 0 to 2500 ms.
All experiments used a version of the change detection task. The
task presents two stimulus arrays to the participant who has to
decide whether there is a change between the two arrays. The task
requires not only the formation of mental representations, but also
the maintenance or storage of these representations across time so
that they can be compared in successive frames. As such, it is a
perceptual as well as a memory task. Simply by manipulating the
study-test interval one changes it from a test of perception to a test
of memory.
The difference in the change detection task, if it occurs, may be
in terms of the addition of a new stimulus, deletion of an old one,
or a swap in the already presented stimuli. Binding is required only
for the last kind of change, a swap between two stimuli. In fact,
the swap detection task was introduced by Wheeler and Treisman
(2002) specifically to study bindings. It is not possible to perform
this task by remembering which features were presented, for all
the same features appear in the study as well as the test display. It
is essential to remember how the features were “combined” to find
which ones swapped. Alvarez and Thompson (2009) have used the
term “feature switch detection” to describe this task. Their work
has also shown that although this task underestimates the bind-
ing capacity of VWM, it is an efficient paradigm for studying the
factors affecting the fragile nature of bindings.
Since the aim was to study the effect of an irrelevant feature
in an experiment, reducing the binding problem to its essentials,
stimuli were defined concomitantly by three properties. The three
features chosen to define the stimuli were location, shape, and
color. The operational problem was how to design a task that
would “break off” one of these elements to study the link or “bind-
ing” between the other two. One solution could have been to hold
this element constant. For example, presenting various shapes in
various locations, and swapping any two, whilst keeping the color
of all the stimuli unchanged. Indeed this has been the procedure
followed by many researchers in the field (e.g., Vogel et al., 2001;
Wheeler and Treisman, 2002). However, it is questionable how far
this manipulation prevents the inclusion of the irrelevant feature
in the bound representation on each trial. If a feature is present
constantly, it can still function as an informative cue. In fact, other
features may be accessed through this feature. On the other hand,
it may also block the effect of other features.
In the literature on conditioning, following Rescorla (1967), it
is well established that the way to make a stimulus truly irrelevant
and non-informative, is to randomize it. This idea was applied
to the design of experiments by randomizing one feature between
the study and test displays to render it non-informative, while test-
ing memory for the combinations of the remaining two features of
each object in the array. Using the swap detection task, location was
randomized between the study and the test display with memory
tested for the color-shape combinations in the study display. Anal-
ogously, shape was randomized to study the link between location
and color, and color was randomized to study the link between
shape and location.
In each case, binding between two of the features was studied
whilst the third was rendered irrelevant through randomization.
The focus was to study how far performance would be disrupted
when a feature was rendered irrelevant through randomization in
comparison to a condition in which it was unchanged. If there
were no differences between unchanged and randomized condi-
tions, it would indicate that participants can remove the unwanted
irrelevant features right from the outset in accordance with task
instructions. Reduced performance in the randomized feature
condition would suggest that all features automatically participate
in the initial representation even if they are irrelevant to the task.
If a convergence occurs over time, it would suggest that relevant
features can be consolidated and irrelevant features can be inhib-
ited only gradually through the control processes of VWM. Thus,
performance in the randomized feature condition was compared
to when the feature was unchanged, to study whether and when
the feature could be deleted from the visual system.
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It was expected that performance in detecting change in bind-
ings would be reduced when a feature is randomized from study to
test as compared to when it is unchanged, if the feature had an ini-
tial representation, despite that the instructions were to ignore the
feature and it was rendered completely non-informative and irrel-
evant to performance. It was also expected that as the visual system
consolidated the binding of relevant features, this irrelevant fea-
ture would be inhibited, leading to a convergence of performance
at longer study-test intervals.
This expectation was confirmed across experiments where loca-
tions were the irrelevant feature and color-shape bindings were to
be detected. There was a convergence of performance at study-test
intervals of 1500 ms or beyond. A similar pattern of interaction
was also found when shapes were randomized to study color-
location binding, and when colors were randomized to study
shape-location bindings (see Logie et al., 2011, for details). This
not only suggests that the effect is very robust, but also attests to the
overriding importance of top-down factors in binding irrespective
of the features involved. All features are treated the same way in
VWM. They are selectively consolidated if they are relevant, and
removed from the mental representation if they are irrelevant.
In the randomized condition, the task used in these experiments
is a further variant of the swap detection task in the sense that in
the test display, not only does the target change, but the distracters
also change. The task becomes even more difficult, for participants
have to decide whether there is a change in the binding of two fea-
tures, when the third feature also changes. They have to ignore
the changes in the one feature, and focus on finding the swap in
the other two. This presumably involves a more demanding and
central cognitive process in which the subject has to consider each
of the stimuli in the test array, and compare whether the binding
is the same as for the ones he holds in his memory.
Nonetheless, there is no denying the differential processing
of features. In line with physiological studies (Zeki et al., 1991;
Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997; Lamberts, 2002, Aymoz and Viviani,
2004) and psychophysical evidence (Magnussen et al., 1996; Mag-
nussen and Greenlee, 1997; Magnussen, 2000), differential pro-
cessing of features was found. There is greater disruption of
performance when locations are randomized than when shapes
or colors are randomized, with the disruption due to randomiza-
tion of colors being the least. In addition, the removal of locations
from the initial representation takes a much longer time than the
removal of shapes or colors.
The differences among the three features, locations, shapes,
and colors, follow the differential perceptual processing of these
features. Location swaps are easiest to detect and location is the
most difficult feature to ignore. Color swaps are the most dif-
ficult to detect, and color is the easiest feature to ignore. The
results for shape fall between these two. This is in consonance
with researchers showing that locations are processed in the dorsal
stream, which is relatively automatic and works on an earlier time
scale than the ventral stream (Velichkovsky, 1982, 2007; Vecera
and Palmer, 2006). Between shape and color, differentiation of
forms happens before the surface features are filled in (Cinel and
Humphreys, 2006; Humphreys et al., 2000, 2009). To be specu-
lative, the differential processing of features might happen with
other features such as orientation, size, textures, etc., as well.
The differences in the amount of disruption experienced by
the participants, imitate the importance of the “to be ignored”
feature in our daily lives. The disruptive effect is least when color
is the feature to be ignored, with a greater amount of disruption
when shape is to be ignored, and the maximum disruption when
location is to be ignored. The correct perception of the location
of objects in space has survival value in our daily navigation of
the world, and reflecting that importance, randomizing location
disrupts performance to the greatest extent in these experiments.
These results go against the overwhelming importance
accorded to locations by many researchers (e.g., Wolfe, 1994; Treis-
man, 2006). Perception may be location based, but memory may
be not only location based, it might well be object based, or feature
based. Just as it is possible to ignore other features, it is possible to
ignore locations too. It is only more difficult, not impossible. As
compared to other features, location is special. But, in itself, it loses
its importance in the binding process if it is not relevant. Thus rel-
evance of features overrides the differential processing of features.
Summary so far
The account of the binding process that emerges is that features
may not be bound together instantaneously and all at the same
time. Instead, their processing in the visual system continues at
different rates. This differential processing affects when they are
bound in object representations. Object representations involv-
ing shape-location bindings are formed most easily or are the
strongest, followed by color-location bindings, followed by shape-
color bindings. Certainly, there is no clear, coherent, strong object
right from the outset. It is also clear that there is a selective process
that binds only some features together. The task relevance of fea-
tures determines whether or not they are bound into the object
representation, i.e., they are bound in the object weighted by their
task relevance. Features are consolidated if relevant, and discarded
if irrelevant, but only as a gradual process.
IS INHIBITION A PERCEPTUAL OR POST – PERCEPTUAL PROCESS?
Any discussion regarding binding of relevant features cannot be
complete without discussing “relevant for what?” Adaptive organ-
isms that we are, the ultimate goal of the process of binding is
necessarily some sort of action. Kahneman et al. (1992) suggested
that we create object files that contain all the perceptual infor-
mation about an object. Nevertheless, as discussed, binding is
not restricted to perception. Via WM, it is linked to actions. As
such, the ideas of “instances” (Logan, 1988) or “event files” (Hom-
mel, 1998, 2004, 2005) containing perceptual as well as action
related information assume importance. Indeed, Davelaar (2011)
postulates that all real world tasks can be denoted as “goal repre-
sentations” which are bindings of their sub representations. The
sub representations are for perceptual inputs, conceptual rules,
and/or motor responses bound together by a memory trace. One
infers that the sub representations are themselves bindings as well,
for example, comprising the task relevant features of sub-states, or
the properties of task-specific control representations.
Hommel (2004) postulated the importance of task relevance
as a factor at the time of initial binding. However, experimental
evidence shows that the inhibition of irrelevant features is gradual
and requires some time to occur (Logie et al., 2011). In another
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study (Jaswal and Logie, 2011), the display duration was increased
from 200 to 900 and 1500 ms. This improved performance overall,
but had no differential effect at the two study-test intervals of 0 and
2000 ms. This indicated that the inhibition of irrelevant features
did not happen during the presentation of the study display, and
is not operational during encoding, but that it is a post-perceptual
process within WM (see Experiment 1, Jaswal and Logie, 2011,
for details). Inhibition was used in many different ways in this
experiment. The stimuli in the study display always being above
capacity, focusing is required to select a region, objects, or features.
This uses the prioritization function of attention. This selection
process necessitates that the rest of the locations, objects, and
features are deselected. These would not influence or reappear
in performance. Thereafter, from the selected representations, of
features, objects, or locations, there is a process of removal of
the irrelevant, unwanted feature. This process begins only after
encoding is complete. This crucial process is presumably a part
of the central executive component of WM, and comes into play
to extract meaning from an otherwise confusing array of stim-
ulus dimensions. Gradually, this inhibitory process is complete,
and the object comprising relevant features emerges to be main-
tained in WM, ready for further processing. Supportive evidence
comes from fMRI studies by Sala and Courtney (2007) who found
reduced activity over time in reaction to “conjunction” stimuli in
cortical regions dedicated to “what” and “where” stimuli. Inter-
estingly, this reduction does not happen for only “what” or only
“where” stimuli. It happens only following bound stimuli which
use both these streams of processing. Analogously, a number of
studies with the preview search procedure (which is very similar to
the task described here) have suggested that “active inhibition” is a
higher order process that follows the initial registration of the stim-
uli (reviewed by Soto et al., 2008). Thus, inhibition of irrelevant
features occurs over time and is presumably a process within WM.
This inhibitory process is rather different from the orienta-
tion function of attention that allows selection of locations and/or
objects from the stimulus display that is presented. Indeed it is
possible to focus and use this latter type of attention even before
the stimuli are displayed or in the complete absence of distracters
(Henderson, 1996). In contrast, the inhibitory process occurs after
stimulus presentation and seems to be directed at everything that
is irrelevant in the stimulus display – be it features or objects.
In this sense, it is similar to distracter suppression, which appears
only after the distracters are identified (Luck and Hillyard, 1994a,b;
Luck et al., 1997; Luck, 1998).
In the area of WM, an inhibitory process was first proposed
by Hasher and Zacks (1988) to account for differences among
older and younger adults in WM. They proposed that successful
processing implied allowing relevant information in and keeping
irrelevant information out. However, they did not apply this idea
to features within bindings, and restricted their view to objects in
WM. Subsequent studies have shown that the memory problems
of older adults are not so much regarding individual features but
about bindings of those features (Chalfonte and Johnson, 1996;
but, see Brockmole et al., 2008). The gradual process of deleting or
inhibiting a feature that is task-irrelevant and possibly disruptive
has been identified as an important aspect of WM executive
functions (Miyake et al., 2000; Friedman and Miyake, 2004).
Summary so far
All features and objects, indeed the whole display, enter the sensory
register of the participants, and gradually, from this representa-
tion, the relevant features and objects are selected and retained,
and the irrelevant ones are discarded. Whether the features partic-
ipate in a preliminarily integrated percept to be refined thereafter
or whether the features are held in separate feature maps is a
moot point. The vast literature on information processing the-
ory has shown that parallel representation of stimulation followed
by serial decision making is a much more efficient procedure, than
selecting each object one by one and making decisions about it
(e.g., Sternberg, 1966, 1967). It being easier to encode all stimuli
and then make the decisions, participants might loosely repre-
sent the irrelevant as well as relevant features initially, deleting
the irrelevant ones only after the display is gone, and no more
relevant features can be committed to memory. Certainly, there
is no clear, coherent, strong object right from the outset. The
deletion of features from within a representation, such that it
becomes a coherent strong object capable of further manipu-
lation, takes time and resources, and is a preliminary phase in
the online processing of objects in WM. Thus, the emergence
of the bound object is a result of an active inhibitory process in
WM.
CONCLUSION: THE PROCESS OF BINDING
The process of binding as understood on the basis of research
reviewed above is illustrated in Figure 1. The five stages repre-
sent cross-sections of the process to aid understanding, otherwise
the process is assumed to be continuous. The area covered by
the ovals gradually reduces to depict the decrease in the amount
of information available to the participant, and also increasingly
focused attention. It is, nevertheless, accepted that attention plays
different kinds of roles in this process. The gradual completion
of the boundaries is used to show the increasing clarity of the
representations.
The whole process is dictated and delimited by instructions
from WM which define the goal for the participant. Even before
the trials begin, the participant is set to ignore the irrelevant fea-
ture. Stage 1 represents stimuli in the real world. Stage 2 is the
initial representation of the stimulus dimensions, which includes
almost all the various features defining the stimuli. However, there
is some loss of information even at this early stage, as a proportion
of the stimuli impinging on the sense organs are selected to be
processed further. This stage contributes to the binding process
by holding information as an almost veridical representation of
reality which can be organized and further consolidated. It cor-
responds to retinotopic iconic memory, and is vulnerable to an
immediate mask. It is also difficult to build up this representa-
tion with sequential presentation when one item vanishes as the
subsequent one is presented.
Stage 3 is a spatiotopic representation with a greater loss of
information than Stage 2, but which has much more informa-
tion available than the later stages. Presumably it corresponds to
the fragile VSTM proposed by Sligte et al. (2008). The process
of active inhibition is dominant between the Stages 3 and 4, and
removes the irrelevant feature, in this case locations. The inhibitory
process is otherwise a necessary component of top-down processes
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FIGURE 1 |The process of binding.
which select relevant information and inhibit irrelevant informa-
tion and operates throughout the binding process. This top-down
processing is achieved by reentrant processes. Notice how reen-
trant processes recover the relevant feature “blue” to be amal-
gamated with “diamond” as represented in the next stage. Stage
4 represents only the relevant features, with increasing overlap
between them to show the strength of binding at this stage. Stage
5 shows features bound as objects in VWM ready for further
processing.
Though the illustration uses location as the feature to be
ignored, it is assumed that analogous processes operate if color
or shapes (or other stimulus dimensions) are to be ignored. The
total duration of this process will vary with the stimulus dimen-
sions involved. As per experimental evidence (Logie et al., 2011),
the duration of the process is shorter when shapes or colors are to
be ignored.
Can any information be directly transferred to WM at all? Is it
possible for some information to bypass these stages and appear
in VWM? One may speculate that the stage sequence is invariant,
although the time scale can be considerably shortened if the broad
attentional window includes a narrowly focused mechanism that
achieves this. This narrow focus may be due to top-down factors,
say, an“intention”to remember all red items, or all curved items, or
the first item presented, or a red plus because it evokes associations
with the Red Cross. Such an intentional focus would necessarily
involve activated representations in LTM. Alternatively, it may at
times, result from the higher activation level of a particular item
due to bottom-up stimulus factors such as salience, first or last
serial position, etc. It is the transactions between top-down and
bottom-up processes which determine the course of the binding
process, although the final outcome is contingent on the dictates
of the task goals held in WM and the relevance of features to them.
REFERENCES
Altmann, C. F., Grodd, W., Kourtzi,
Z., Bulthoff, H. H., and Karnath,
H. O. (2005). Similar cortical cor-
relates underlie visual object identi-
fication and orientation judgment.
Neuropsychologia 43, 2101–2108.
Alvarez, G. A., Konkle, T., and Oliva,
A. (2007). Searching in dynamic
displays: effects of configural pre-
dictability and spatiotemporal con-
tinuity. J. Vis. 7(14), 1–12. doi:
10.1167/7.14.12
Alvarez, G. A., and Thompson,
T. (2009). Overwriting and
rebinding: why feature-switch
detection tasks underestimate
the binding capacity of visual
working memory. Vis. Cogn. 17,
141–159.
Aymoz, C., and Viviani, P. (2004). Per-
ceptual asynchronies for biological
and non-biological visual events.
Vision Res. 44, 1547–1563.
Baars, B. J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory
of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Baddeley, A. D. (2000). The
episodic buffer: a new com-
ponent of working memory?
Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 4,
417–423.
Baddeley, A. D. (2003). Working mem-
ory: looking back and looking for-
ward. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 4, 829–839.
Baddeley, A. D. (2007). Working Mem-
ory, Thought, and Action. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Baddeley, A. D., and Hitch, G. J. (1974).
“Working memory,” in The Psychol-
ogy of Learning and Motivation, Vol.
VIII, ed. G. H. Bower (New York:
Academic Press), 47–90.
Baddeley, A. D., and Logie, R. H.
(1999). “Working memory: the mul-
tiple component model,” in Models
of Working Memory: Mechanisms of
Active Maintenance and Control, eds
A. Miyake and P. Shah (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 28–61.
Braet, W., and Humphreys, G. W.
(2009). The role of reentrant
processes in feature binding: evi-
dence from neuropsychology and
TMS on late onset illusory conjunc-
tions. Vis. Cogn. 17, 25–47.
Brisson, B., Leblanc, E., and Joli-
coeur, P. (2009). Contingent capture
of visual-spatial attention depends
on capacity-limited central mecha-
nisms: evidence from human elec-
trophysiology and the psychological
refractory period. Biol. Psychol. 80,
218–225.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 309 | 12
Jaswal The importance of being relevant
Brockmole, J. R., Parra, M. A., Della
Sala, S., and Logie, R. (2008). Do
binding deficits account for age-
related decline in visual working
memory? Psychon. Bull. Rev. 15,
543–547.
Bullier, J. (2001). Feedback connections
and conscious vision. Trends Cogn.
Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 5, 369–370.
Cer, D. M., and O’Reilly, R. C. (2006).
“Neural mechanisms of binding in
the hippocampus and neocortex:
insights from computational mod-
els,” in Handbook of Binding and
Memory: Perspectives from Cogni-
tive Neuroscience, eds H. D. Zim-
mer, A. Mecklinger, and U. Linden-
berger (New York: Oxford University
Press), 200–219.
Chalfonte, B. L., and Johnson, M. K.
(1996). Feature memory and bind-
ing in young and older adults. Mem.
Cognit. 24, 403–416.
Chan, L. K. H., and Hayward, W. G.
(2009). Feature integration theory
revisited: dissociating feature detec-
tion and attentional guidance in
visual search. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 35, 119–132.
Chelazzi, L., Miller, E. K., Duncan,
J., and Desimone, R. (1993). A
neural basis for visual-search in infe-
rior temporal cortex. Nature 363,
345–347.
Cinel, C., and Humphreys, G. W. (2006).
On the relations between implicit
and explicit spatial binding: evi-
dence from Balint’s syndrome.Cogn.
Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 6, 127–140.
Crick, F., and Koch, C. (1990). Some
reflections on visual awareness.
Brain 55, 953–962.
Crick, F., and Koch, C. (2003). A frame-
work for consciousness. Nat. Neu-
rosci. 6, 119–126.
Damasio, A. R. (1989). Time-locked
multiregional retroactivation – a
systems-level proposal for the neural
substrates of recall and recognition.
Cognition 33, 25–62.
Davelaar, E. J. (2011). Processes ver-
sus representations: cognitive con-
trol as emergent, yet componential.
Top. Cogn. Sci. 3, 247–252.
De Fockert, J. W., Rees, G., Frith, C. D.,
and Lavie, N. (2001). The role of
working memory in visual selective
attention. Science 291, 1803–1806.
Dehaene, S., and Changeux, J. P. (2004).
“Neural mechanisms for access to
consciousness,” in The Cognitive
Neurosciences, 3rd Edn, ed. M. Gaz-
zaniga (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press),
1145–1158.
Desimone, R., and Duncan, J. (1995).
Neural mechanisms of selective
visual-attention. Annu. Rev. Neu-
rosci. 18, 193–222.
Di Lollo, V., Enns, J. T., and Rensink,
R. A. (2000). Competition for
consciousness among visual events:
the psychophysics of reentrant visual
processes. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 129,
481–507.
Duncan, J. (1980). The Locus of inter-
ference in the perception of simul-
taneous stimuli. Psychol. Rev. 87,
272–300.
Duncan, J. (1984). Selective attention
and the organization of visual infor-
mation. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 113,
501–517.
Duncan, J. (1996). Competitive brain
systems in selective attention. Int. J.
Psychol. 31, 3343–3343.
Duncan, J. (1998). Converging levels
of analysis in the cognitive neuro-
science of visual attention. Philos.
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 353,
1307–1317.
Duncan, J. (2006). EPS mid-career
award 2004 – brain mechanisms of
attention. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 59,
2–27.
Duncan, J., Humphreys, G., and Ward,
R. (1997). Competitive brain activ-
ity in visual attention. Curr. Opin.
Neurobiol. 7, 255–261.
Edelman, G. M. (1978). “Group selec-
tion and phasic re-entrant signal-
ing: a theory of higher brain func-
tions,” in The Mindful Brain, eds
G. M. Edelman and V. B. Mount-
castle (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
51–l00.
Egly, R., Driver, J., and Rafal, R.
D. (1994). Shifting visual-attention
between objects and locations – evi-
dence from normal and parietal
lesion subjects. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
123, 161–177.
Feigenson, L., and Carey, S. (2005). On
the limits of infants’ quantification
of small object arrays. Cognition 97,
295–313.
Fodor, J. A., and Pylyshyn, Z. (1988).
Connectionism and cognitive archi-
tecture: a critical analysis. Cognition
28, 3–71.
Folk, C. L., Leber, A. B., and Egeth,
H. E. (2008). Top-down con-
trol settings and the attentional
blink: evidence for nonspatial con-
tingent capture. Vis. cogn. 16,
616–642.
Folk, C. L., and Remington, R. (2006).
Top-down modulation of preatten-
tive processing: testing the recovery
account of contingent capture. Vis.
cogn. 14, 445–465.
Folk, C. L., Remington, R. W., and
Johnston, J. C. (1992). Involuntary
covert orienting is contingent on
attentional control settings. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 18,
1030–1044.
Folk, C. L., Remington, R. W., and John-
ston, J. C. (1993). Contingent atten-
tional capture – a reply to Yantis
(1993). J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 19, 682–685.
Folk, C. L., Remington, R. W., and Wu, S.
C. (2009). Additivity of abrupt onset
effects supports nonspatial distrac-
tion, not the capture of spatial atten-
tion. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 71,
308–313.
Forster, S., and Lavie, N. (2007).
High perceptual load makes every-
body equal – eliminating indi-
vidual differences in distractibil-
ity with load. Psychol. Sci. 18,
377–381.
Forster, S., and Lavie, N. (2008). Failures
to ignore entirely irrelevant distrac-
tors: the role of load. J. Exp. Psychol.
Appl. 14, 73–83.
Forster, S., and Lavie, N. (2009). Har-
nessing the wandering mind: the role
of perceptual load. Cognition 111,
345–355.
Friedman, N. P., and Miyake, A. (2004).
The relations among inhibition and
interference control functions: a
latent-variable analysis. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Gen. 133, 101–135.
Gray, C. M. (1999). The temporal cor-
relation hypothesis of visual fea-
ture integration: still alive and well.
Neuron 24, 31–47.
Gray, C. M., Engel, A. K., Konig, P., and
Singer, W. (1992). Synchronization
of oscillatory neuronal responses in
cat striate cortex – temporal proper-
ties. Vis. Neurosci. 8, 337–347.
Hamker, F. H. (2003). The reen-
try hypothesis: linking eye move-
ments to visual perception. J. Vis. 3,
808–816.
Hasher, L., and Zacks, R. T. (1988).
“Working memory, comprehension
and aging: a review and a new
view,” in The Psychology of Learning
and Motivation, Vol. 22, ed. G. H.
Bower (New York: Academic Press),
195–225.
Henderson, J. M. (1996). Spatial pre-
cues affect target discrimination in
the absence of visual noise. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 22,
780–787.
Hochstein, S., and Ahissar, M. (2002).
View from the top: hierarchies and
reverse hierarchies in the visual sys-
tem. Neuron 36, 791–804.
Hollingworth, A., and Luck, S. J. (2009).
The role of visual working mem-
ory (VWM) in the control of gaze
during visual search. Atten. Percept.
Psychophys. 71, 936–949.
Hollingworth, A., Richard, A. M., and
Luck, S. J. (2008). Understanding the
function of visual short-term mem-
ory: transsaccadic memory, object
correspondence, and gaze correc-
tion. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 137,
163–181.
Hommel,B. (1998). Event files: evidence
for automatic integration of stimu-
lus response episodes. Vis. Cogn. 5,
183–216.
Hommel, B. (2004). Event files: feature
binding in and across perception and
action. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.)
8, 494–500.
Hommel, B. (2005). How much
attention does an event file need? J.
Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.
31, 1067–1082.
Hommel, B., and Colzato, L. S. (2009).
When an object is more than a
binding of its features: evidence for
two mechanisms of visual feature
integration. Vis. Cogn. 17, 120–140.
Horowitz, T. S., and Wolfe, J. M. (1998).
Visual search has no memory.Nature
394, 575–577.
Houtkamp, R., and Roelfsema, P. R.
(2006). The effect of items in work-
ing memory on the deployment of
attention and the eyes during visual
search. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 32, 423–442.
Hubel, D. H., and Wiesel, T. N. (1959).
Receptive fields of single neurones
in the cats striate cortex. J. Physiol.
(Lond.) 148, 574–591.
Hubel, D. H., and Wiesel, T. N. (1962).
Receptive fields, binocular interac-
tion and functional architecture in
cats visual cortex. J. Physiol. (Lond.)
160, 106–154.
Hubel, D. H., and Wiesel, T. N.
(1968). Receptive fields and func-
tional architecture of monkey stri-
ate cortex. J. Physiol. (Lond.) 195,
215–243.
Humphreys, G. W. (1998). Neural rep-
resentation of objects in space: a dual
coding account. Philos. Trans. R. Soc.
Lond. B Biol. Sci. 353, 1341–1351.
Humphreys,G. W. (2001). A multi-stage
account of binding in vision: neu-
ropsychological evidence. Vis. Cogn.
8, 381–410.
Humphreys, G. W., Cinel, C., Wolfe, J.,
Olson, A., and Klempen, N. (2000).
Fractionating the binding process:
neuropsychological evidence distin-
guishing binding of form from bind-
ing of surface features.Vision Res. 40,
1569–1596.
Humphreys, G. W., Hodsoll, J., and Rid-
doch, M. J. (2009). Fractionating the
binding process: neuropsychologi-
cal evidence from reversed search
efficiencies. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 35, 627–647.
Jaswal, S., and Logie, R. H. (2011). Con-
figural encoding in visual feature
binding. J. Cogn. Psychol. (Hove) 23,
586–603.
www.frontiersin.org August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 309 | 13
Jaswal The importance of being relevant
Jehee, J. F. M., Lamme, V. A. F., and
Roelfsema, P. R. (2007). Bound-
ary assignment in a recurrent net-
work architecture. Vision Res. 47,
1153–1165.
Jiang, Y. H., Olson, I. R., and Chun,
M. M. (2000). Organization of
visual short-term memory. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 26,
683–702.
Kahneman, D., Treisman, A., and Gibbs,
B. J. (1992). The reviewing of object
files – object-specific integration
of information. Cogn. Psychol. 24,
175–219.
Kastner, S., De Weerd, P., Desimone,
R., and Ungerleider, L. C. (1998).
Mechanisms of directed attention
in the human extrastriate cortex as
revealed by functional MRI. Science
282, 108–111.
Lamberts, K. (2002). Feature sampling
in categorization and recognition of
objects. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 55,
141–154.
Lamme, V. A. F., and Roelfsema, P. R.
(2000). The distinct modes of vision
offered by feedforward and recur-
rent processing. Trends Neurosci. 23,
571–579.
Lavie, N., and De Fockert, J. (2005). The
role of working memory in atten-
tional capture. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 12,
669–674.
Lavie, N., and De Fockert, J. (2006).
Frontal control of attentional cap-
ture in visual search. Vis. Cogn. 14,
863–876.
Lavie, N., Hirst, A., De Fockert, J. W.,
and Viding, E. (2004). Load theory
of selective attention and cognitive
control. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 133,
339–354.
Linnell, K. J., and Humphreys, G. W.
(2004). Attentional selection of a
peripheral ring overrules the central
attentional bias. Percept. Psychophys.
66, 743–751.
Linnell, K. J., and Humphreys, G. W.
(2007). Top-down-driven grouping
overrules the central attentional bias.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Per-
form. 33, 530–548.
Logan, G. D. (1988). Toward an instance
theory of automatization. Psychol.
Rev. 95, 492–527.
Logie, R. H. (2003). “Spatial and visual
working memory: a mental work-
space,” in The Psychology of Learn-
ing and Motivation, Vol. 42, eds D.
Irwin and B. Ross (San Diego, CA:
Academic Press), 37–78.
Logie, R. H., Brockmole, J. R., and
Jaswal, S. (2011). Feature binding in
visual short-term memory is unaf-
fected by task-irrelevant changes of
location, shape, and color. Mem.
Cognit. 39, 24–36.
Luck, S. J. (1998). Sources of dual-task
interference: evidence from human
electrophysiology. Psychol. Sci. 9,
223–227.
Luck, S. J., Girelli, M., McDermott, M.
T., and Ford, M. A. (1997). Bridg-
ing the gap between monkey neu-
rophysiology and human percep-
tion: an ambiguity resolution theory
of visual selective attention. Cogn.
Psychol. 33, 64–87.
Luck, S. J., and Hillyard, S. A. (1994a).
Electrophysiological correlates of
feature analysis during visual-
search. Psychophysiology 31,
291–308.
Luck, S. J., and Hillyard, S. A. (1994b).
Spatial-filtering during visual-
search – evidence from human
electrophysiology. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 20,
1000–1014.
Luck, S. J., and Vogel, E. K. (1997).
The capacity of visual work-
ing memory for features and
conjunctions. Nature 390,
279–281.
MacLeod, K., Backer,A., and Laurent, G.
(1998). Who reads temporal infor-
mation contained across synchro-
nized and oscillatory spike trains?
Nature 395, 693–698.
Magnussen, S. (2000). Low-level mem-
ory processes in vision. Trends Neu-
rosci. 23, 247–251.
Magnussen, S., and Greenlee, M. W.
(1997). Competition and sharing of
processing resources in visual dis-
crimination. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 23, 1603–1616.
Magnussen, S., Greenlee, M. W., and
Thomas, J. P. (1996). Parallel pro-
cessing in visual short-term mem-
ory. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 22, 202–212.
Martinovic, J., Gruber, T., Ohla, K.,
and Muller, M. M. (2009). Induced
gamma-band activity elicited by
visual representation of unattended
objects. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21,
42–57.
Mel, B. W., and Fiser, J. (2000). Mini-
mizing binding errors using learned
conjunctive features. Neural Com-
put. 12, 247–278.
Mitroff, S. R., and Alvarez, G. A. (2007).
Space and time, not surface features,
guide object persistence. Psychon.
Bull. Rev. 14, 1199–1204.
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson,
M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A.,
and Wager, T. D. (2000). The unity
and diversity of executive functions
and their contributions to complex
“frontal lobe” tasks: a latent variable
analysis. Cogn. Psychol. 41, 49–100.
Miyake, A., and Shah, P. (eds).
(1999). Models of Working Memory.
Mechanisms of Active Maintenance
and Executive Control. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Moores, E., and Maxwell, J. P. (2008).
The role of prior exposure in the
capture of attention by items in
working memory. Vis. Cogn. 16,
675–695.
Moutoussis, K., and Zeki, S. (1997). A
direct demonstration of perceptual
asynchrony in vision. Proc. R. Soc.
Lond. B Biol. Sci. 264, 393–399.
Muller, H. J., Geyer, T., Zehetleitner,
M., and Krummenacher, J. (2009).
Attentional capture by salient color
singleton distractors is modulated by
top-down dimensional set. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 35,
1–16.
Muller, H. J., and Krummenacher, J.
(2006). Visual search and selective
attention. Vis. Cogn. 14, 389–410.
Murre, J. M. J., Wolters, G., and
Raffone, A. (2006). “Binding in
working memory and long term
memory: towards an integrated
model,” in Handbook of Binding and
Memory: Perspectives from Cogni-
tive Neuroscience, eds H. D. Zim-
mer, A. Mecklinger, and U. Linden-
berger (New York: Oxford University
Press), 221–250.
O’Craven, K. M., Downing, P., and Kan-
wisher, N. (1999). fMRI evidence for
objects as the units of attentional
selection. Nature 401, 584–587.
Olivers, C. N. L., Meijer, F., and
Theeuwes, J. (2006). Feature-based
memory-driven attentional capture:
visual working memory content
affects visual attention. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 32,
1243–1265.
Osaka, N., Logie, R. H., and D’Esposito,
M. (eds). (2007). The Cognitive
Neuroscience of Working Memory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pan, Y., Xu, B. H., and Soto, D.
(2009). Dimension-based working
memory-driven capture of visual
selection. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 62,
1123–1131.
Park, S., Kim, M. S., and Chun, M. M.
(2007). Concurrent working mem-
ory load can facilitate selective atten-
tion: evidence for specialized load. J.
Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.
33, 1062–1075.
Pins, D., Meyer, M. E., Foucher, J.,
Humphreys, G., and Boucart, M.
(2004). Neural correlates of implicit
object identification.Neuropsycholo-
gia 42, 1247–1259.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2004). Some puzzling
findings in multiple object tracking:
I. Tracking without keeping track
of object identities. Vis. Cogn. 11,
801–822.
Remington, R. W., Johnston, J. C.,
and Yantis, S. (1992). Involun-
tary attentional capture by abrupt
onsets. Percept. Psychophys. 51,
279–290.
Rescorla, R. A. (1967). Pavlovian
conditioning and its proper con-
trol procedures. Psychol. Rev. 74,
71–80.
Roelfsema, P. R. (2006). Cortical algo-
rithms for perceptual grouping.
Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 29, 203–227.
Saalmann, Y. B., Pigarev, I. N., and
Vidyasagar, T. R. (2007). Neural
mechanisms of visual attention:
how top-down feedback highlights
relevant locations. Science 316,
1612–1615.
Sala, J. B., and Courtney, S. M. (2007).
Binding of what and where dur-
ing working memory maintenance.
Cortex 43, 5–21.
Schoenfeld, M. A., Tempelmann, C.,
Martinez, A., Hopf, J. M., Sattler, C.,
Heinze, H. J., and Hillyard, S. A.
(2003). Dynamics of feature bind-
ing during object-selective attention.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 100,
11806–11811.
Schreij, D., Owens, C., and Theeuwes, J.
(2008). Abrupt onsets capture atten-
tion independent of top-down con-
trol settings. Percept. Psychophys. 70,
208–218.
Seth, A. K., McKinstry, J. L., Edelman, G.
M., and Krichmar, J. L. (2004).Visual
binding through reentrant connec-
tivity and dynamic synchronization
in a brain-based device. Cereb. Cor-
tex 14, 1185–1199.
Shafritz, K. M., Gore, J. C., and Marois,
R. (2002). The role of the pari-
etal cortex in visual feature bind-
ing. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 99,
10917–10922.
Silvanto, J., Muggleton, N., Lavie, N.,
and Walsh, V. (2009). The percep-
tual and functional consequences of
parietal top-down modulation on
the visual cortex. Cereb. Cortex 19,
327–330.
Singer, W. (1999). Neuronal synchrony:
a versatile code for the definition of
relations? Neuron 24, 49–65.
Singer, W., and Gray, C. M. (1995).
Visual feature integration and
the temporal correlation hypoth-
esis. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 18,
555–586.
Sligte, I. G., Scholte, H. S., and
Lamme, V. A. F. (2008). Are there
multiple visual short-term mem-
ory stores? PLoS ONE 3, e1699.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001699
Soto, D., Hodsoll, J., Rotshtein, P.,
and Humphreys, G. W. (2008).
Automatic guidance of atten-
tion from working memory.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 309 | 14
Jaswal The importance of being relevant
Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 12,
342–348.
Soto, D., and Humphreys, G. W. (2008).
Stressing the mind: the effect of
cognitive load and articulatory sup-
pression on attentional guidance
from working memory. Percept. Psy-
chophys. 70, 924–934.
Soto, D., and Humphreys, G. W.
(2009). Automatic selection of irrel-
evant object features through work-
ing memory evidence for top-down
attentional capture. Exp. Psychol. 56,
165–172.
Soto, D., Humphreys, G. W., and Rot-
shtein, P. (2007). Dissociating the
neural mechanisms of memory-
based guidance of visual selection.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104,
17186–17191.
Sternberg, S. (1966). High-speed scan-
ning in human memory. Science 153,
652–654.
Sternberg, S. (1967). Two operations in
character recognition – some evi-
dence from reaction-time measure-
ments. Percept. Psychophys. 2, 45–53.
Theeuwes, J. (1992). Perceptual selec-
tivity for color and form. Percept.
Psychophys. 51, 599–606.
Theeuwes, J. (2004). Top-down search
strategies cannot override atten-
tional capture. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 11,
65–70.
Theeuwes, J., Reimann, B., and Mortier,
K. (2006). Visual search for featural
singletons: no top-down modula-
tion, only bottom-up priming. Vis.
Cogn. 14, 466–489.
Thoma, V., Hummel, J. E., and
Davidoff, J. (2004). Evidence for
holistic representations of ignored
images and analytic representations
of attended images. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 30,
257–267.
Treisman, A. (1988). Features and
objects – the 14th Bartlett Memorial
Lecture. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 40,
201–237.
Treisman, A. (1996). The binding
problem. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 6,
171–178.
Treisman, A. (1998). Feature binding,
attention and object perception.Phi-
los. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci.
353, 1295–1306.
Treisman, A. (2006). How the deploy-
ment of attention determines what
we see. Vis. Cogn. 14, 411–443.
Treisman, A., and Gelade, G. (1980).
Feature-integration theory of atten-
tion. Cogn. Psychol. 12, 97–136.
Treisman, A., and Sato, S. (1990). Con-
junction search revisited. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 16,
459–478.
Treisman, A., and Zhang, W. W. (2006).
Location and binding in visual
working memory. Mem. Cognit. 34,
1704–1719.
Van der Meulen, M., Logie, R. H., and
Della Sala, S. (2009). Selective inter-
ference with image retention and
generation: evidence for the work-
space model. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 62,
1568–1580.
Van der Togt, C., Kalitzin, S., Spekrei-
jse, H., Lamme, V. A. F., and
Super, H. (2006). Synchrony dynam-
ics in monkey V1 predict success in
visual detection. Cereb. Cortex 16,
136–148.
VanRullen, R. (2009). Binding hard-
wired versus on-demand feature
conjunctions. Vis. Cogn. 17,
103–119.
Vecera, S. P., and Palmer, S. E.
(2006). Grounding the figure: sur-
face attachment influences figure-
ground organization. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 13, 563–569.
Velichkovsky, B. M. (1982). “Visual cog-
nition and its spatial-temporal con-
text,” in Cognitive Research in Psy-
chology, eds F. Klix, E. Van der
Meer, and J. Hoffmann (Amsterdam:
North Holland), 63–79.
Velichkovsky, B. M. (2007). Towards an
evolutionary framework for human
cognitive neuroscience. Biol. Theory
2, 3–6.
Vidal, J. R., Gauchou, H. L., Tallon-
Baudry, C., and O’Regan, J. K.
(2005). Relational information
in visual short-term memory:
the structural gist. J. Vis. 5,
244–256.
Vogel, E. K., Woodman, G. F., and
Luck, S. J. (2001). Storage of fea-
tures, conjunctions, and objects in
visual working memory. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 27,
92–114.
Von der Malsburg, C. (1981). “The cor-
relation theory of brain function.
MPI Biophysical Chemistry, Inter-
nal Report 81-2,” in Models of Neural
Networks II, eds E. Domany, J. L. V.
Hemmen, and K. Schulten (Berlin:
Springer), 95–119.
Wheeler, M. E., and Treisman, A. M.
(2002). Binding in short-term visual
memory. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 131,
48–64.
Williams, C. C., Henderson, J. M., and
Zacks, R. T. (2005). Incidental visual
memory for targets and distracters
in visual search. Percept. Psychophys.
67, 816–827.
Winkler, I., Czigler, I., Sussman, E.,
Horvath, J., and Balazs, L. (2005).
Preattentive binding of auditory and
visual stimulus features. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 17, 320–339.
Wolfe, J. M. (1994). Guided Search 2.0 –
a revised model of visual-search.
Psychon. Bull. Rev. 1, 202–238.
Wolfe, J. M., Cave, K. R., and Franzel,
S. L. (1989). Guided Search – an
alternative to the feature integra-
tion model for visual-search. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 15,
419–433.
Woodman, G. F., and Luck, S. J. (2007).
Do the contents of visual work-
ing memory automatically influence
attentional selection during visual
search? J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 33, 363–377.
Zeki, S., Watson, J. D. G., Lueck, C.
J., Friston, K. J., Kennard, C., and
Frackowiak, R. S. J. (1991). A direct
demonstration of functional special-
ization in human visual cortex. J.
Neurosci. 11, 641–649.
Zimmer, H. D., Mecklinger, A., and
Lindenberger, U. (2006). “Levels of
binding: types, mechanisms, and
functions of binding,” in Handbook
of Binding and Memory: Perspec-
tives from Cognitive Neuroscience,
eds H. D. Zimmer, A. Meck-
linger, and U. Lindenberger (New
York: Oxford University Press),
3–22.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 15 April 2012; accepted: 06
August 2012; published online: 30 August
2012.
Citation: Jaswal S (2012) The impor-
tance of being relevant. Front. Psychology
3:309. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00309
This article was submitted to Frontiers in
Cognitive Science, a specialty of Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Jaswal. This is an
open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribu-
tion License, which permits use, distrib-
ution and reproduction in other forums,
provided the original authors and source
are credited and subject to any copy-
right notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
www.frontiersin.org August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 309 | 15
